A privacy violation occurs when the association between an individual identity and data considered private by that individual is obtained by an unauthorized party. Uncertainty and indistinguishability are two independent aspects that characterize the degree of this association being revealed. Indistinguishability refers to the property that the attacker cannot see the difference among a group of individuals, while uncertainty refers to the property that the attacker cannot tell which private value, among a group of values, an individual actually has. This paper investigates the notion of indistinguishability as a general form of anonymity, applicable, for example, not only to generalized private tables, but to relational views and to sets of views obtained by multiple queries over a private database table. It is shown how indistinguishability is highly influenced by certain symmetries among individuals, in the released data, with respect to their private values. The paper provides both theoretical results and practical algorithms for checking if a specific set of views over a private table provide sufficient indistinguishability.
Introduction
In many data applications, it is necessary to measure privacy disclosure in released data to protect individual privacy while satisfying application requirements. A privacy violation occurs when the association between an individual identity and the data considered private by that individual is obtained by an unauthorized party. Uncertainty and indistinguishability are two independent aspects that characterize the degree of this association being revealed. Indistinguishability refers to the property that the attacker cannot see the difference among a group of individuals, while uncertainty refers to the property that the attacker cannot tell which private value, among a group of values, an individual actually has.
The measurement metrics used in prior work have mainly been based on uncertainty of private property values, i.e., the uncertainty what private value an individual has. These metrics can be classified into two categories: nonprobabilistic and probabilistic. The non-probabilistic metrics are based on whether the private value of an individual can be uniquely inferred from the released data [1, 23, 8, 18, 6, 17] or whether the cardinality of the set of possible private values inferred for an individual is large enough [29, 32] . The probabilistic metrics are based on some characteristics of the probability distribution of the possible private values inferred from the released data [3, 2, 11, 10, 16, 4] (see Section 5 for more details).
However, uncertainty is only one aspect of privacy and it alone does not provide adequate protection. For example, we may reveal employee John's salary to be in a large interval (say, 100K to 300K annually). There may be enough uncertainty. However, if we also reveal that the salaries of all other employees are in ranges that are totally different from John's range (say, all are subranges of 50K to 100K), then John's privacy may still be violated.
To adequately protect privacy, we need to consider the other aspect, namely, indistinguishability. Indeed, the privacy breach in the above example can be viewed as due to the fact that from the released data, an individual is different from all other individuals in terms of their possible private values. In other words, the example violates a privacy requirement, namely, the "protection from being brought to the attention of others" [12] . What we need is to have each individual belong to a group of individuals who are indistinguishable from each other in terms of their possible private values derived from the released data. In this way, an individual is hidden in a crowd that consists of individuals who have similar/same possible private values. For instance, in the above salary example, to protect John's privacy, we may want to make sure that attackers can only derive from the released data that a large group of employees have the same range as John's for their possible salaries.
The notion of k-anonymization [27, 28, 24, 5, 20] aims at achieving a certain degree of indistinguishability. More specifically, the idea of k-anonymization is to recode, mostly by generalization, publicly available quasi-IDs in a single released table, so that at least k individuals will have the same recoded quasiIDs. (Quasi-IDs are combination of attributes whose values can be used to identify groups of (and possibly single) individuals through external sources [27, 28] .) While k-anonymity is an interesting notion, it only applies to anonymized tables. What can we say about privacy disclosure, in terms of the indistinguishability of individuals associated to specific private values, when a sequence of queries on private data is answered? How can we check for indistiguishability for a view based on projection and selection, possibly including sensitive attributes, is released? How indistinguishability is reduced when the information of two or more views can be combined? While uncertainty has been extensively studied [1, 8, 18, 6, 29, 17] , even in the case of the release of multiple views [32] , the answers to the above questions are essentially open and this paper focuses on these issues.
We illustrate the problem of indistinguishability for multiple views by Example 1, which also introduces the set of private data that will be considered throughout the paper in the examples illustrating definitions and verification procedures.
Example 1 As a running example, we consider data from the database of a medical institution including general census data on the individual patient as well as the total amount that has been charged to the patient by the institution and the last problem regarding her health condition, in the form of a diagnosis. The private table T bl is reported in Figure 1 . The public attributes (denoted with P A in the paper) are Zip, Age, Race, Gender, and Charge, while the sensitive attribute is Diagnosis. We use t 1 , . . . , t 12 to denote the tuples in the table and we also assume that P A is a quasi-ID such that each tuple can re-identify a single individual; hence t i [P A] identifies a particular individual for each i. In the sequel, we use t i [P A] and the individual identified by t i [P A] interchangeably. The first view by itself leaves the four patients living in Zip 22030 as indistinguishable, hence each of them may be associated with one of the Diagnosis. It would be considered 4-anonymous according to k-anonymity definition and also 4-SIND, i.e., having indistinguishability in a group of 4 individuals, according to our proposal (SIND is defined in Section 2.3).
Consider the second view by itself. From the view, with the knowledge of the public part of the private table Π P A (T bl), we can only know that one of the two black females has Obesity, but these two individuals are indistinguishable, and therefore, this view provides indistinguishability in a group of 2 individuals, i.e., 2-SIND. It's not clear how k-anonymity notion may apply here. Now consider the case in which an adversary obtains both views at the same time. He now knows that, among other things, that none of the two 39-year-old patients at Zip 22030 have Obesity (from the second view and since they are not females), and one of the patients identified by t 3 [P A] and t 4 [P A] must be the one with Obesity as there must be one patient having Obesity (from the above fact and the first view). This conclusion should reduce the anonymity of the involved individuals. However, it is not clear how to use the notion of k-anonymity to evaluate this effect. In contrast, we will show how it can be evaluated according to our definition that when two views are considered, we only achieve 2-SIND, even for the four patients at Zip 22030. In this paper, we define three variants of indistinguishability, and the corresponding privacy metrics, that can be applied to general situations, including anonymized tables and relational views. We show that k-anonymization is a special case of one kind of indistinguishability under a certain assumption (see Section 2.4).
Gender Diagnosis
The first notion of indistinguishability is based on probability. This definition probably provides the best characterization and it is theoretically elegant. While it is useful as a reference notion, it has the drawback of not admitting practical automatic methods for its verification. This is mainly due to the difficulty in obtaining required a priori distributions of private values. The second and the third are based on certain symmetries between individuals and their private values in the released data. More specifically, the second definition requires symmetry for all possible private values while the third definition requires symmetry only with respect to certain subsets of possible private values.
Based on the formal framework, we study the problem of deciding whether a set of database views provides enough indistinguishability. We study the worstcase computational complexity of deciding each kind of indistinguishability and identify several subcases that admit polynomial verification algorithms. We present in detail some of these algorithms and show that they also provide an effective solution for the general case, if a conservative approach is considered. We also provide preliminary results for the dynamic private table situation, i.e., how to ensure indistinguishability when the private table is updated. We present a transformation from the case of dynamic private tables into the case of static tables.
Finally, we should note that uncertainty and indistinguishability are two independent aspects for providing privacy; we have shown that uncertainty by itself is insufficient, and it has been observed that the form of indistinguishability provided by k-anonymity does not ensure uncertainty either [22, 21] . The same applies to general indistinguishability; referring to our John's salary example earlier, if in the released data many employees have the same single possible salary value, then these employees are all indistinguishable from each other in terms of their salaries, but there is not enough uncertainty to protect their privacy (all their salaries are the same and revealed!).
While the notion of indistinguishability proposed in this paper takes into account the private values associated to individuals, it is not the purpose of this paper to provide an integrated solution for indistinguishability and uncertainty; we have illustrated above that there are several issues still open concerning indistinguishability alone. Extensions and integration with other solutions will be discussed in Section 6.
We summarize the contributions of this paper as follows: (1) We identify indistinguishability as a more generally applicable notion of anonymity, provide formal definitions of different kinds of indistinguishability, and study their properties. (2) We analyze the computational complexity and introduce practical verification methods for deciding whether a set of database views provides enough indistinguishability.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. We give formal definitions of indistinguishability and privacy metrics in Section 2. We then focus on checking database views against these privacy metrics in Section 3. We investigate the metrics and checking methods in the special case in which private tables are subject to updates in Section 4. In Section 5 we review the related work, and we conclude the paper in Section 6 presenting also some interesting research directions.
Theoretical and practical characterizations of indistinguishability
In this section we define a formal framework that will be used to provide a theoretical characterization of the indistinguishability property. We will start with a probabilistic characterization, and then introduce two alternative characterizations that admit more practical methods to check if a set of views provides a certain degree of indistinguishability. The relationships between these alternative characterizations will be explained.
Preliminaries
We consider releasing data from a single private table T bl with schema Attr(T bl).
The attributes in Attr(T bl) are partitioned into two sets, P A and SA. The set P A consists of the Public Attributes; SA consists of the Sensitive Attributes, i.e., attributes whose value if released together with the identity of the user leads to privacy violation. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume SA only has one attribute. We assume that the projection on P A, Π P A (T bl), is publicly known. We believe this assumption is realistic in many situations. In other situations where this is not true, we may view our approach as providing a conservative privacy measure.
Given a relation r P A on P A, we will use I P A to denote the set {I|Π P A (I) = r P A }, i.e., the set of the relations on Attr(T bl) whose P A-projection coincides with r P A . The domain of SA is denoted by Dom(SA). A tuple of an instance in I P A is denoted by t or (b, p), where b is in Π P A (T bl) and p is in Dom(SA). The set I P A corresponds to all possible private table instances by only knowing Π P A (T bl).
Furthermore, we assume P A is a key in Attr(T bl), which means that each composite value on P A appears at most once in the private table. Intuitively, each composite value on P A is assumed to uniquely identify an individual (possibly using also external public information), and hence the tuples in T bl actually describe associations of the sensitive attribute values with individuals. Such associations are the private information to be protected.
We assume that the data in T bl are being released with a publicly-known function M . We also use v to denote the result of M () on the private table, i.e., v = M (T bl). Examples of function M () include an anonymization procedure, and a set of queries (views) on a single table on Attr(T bl). The table in Figure 1 will be used throughout the paper as an example of private table from which different sets of views will be considered for release.
Probabilistic Indistinguishability
An accurate characterization of indistinguishability between two individuals is captured by a probabilistic definition. In this setting, given a relation r P A on P A, we denote with I P A the set of relations I on Attr(T bl) whose P A-projection coincides with r P A , i.e., I P A = {I | Π P A (I) = r P A }. Given the domain of SA, and possibly other knowledge, there will be different probabilities of certain sensitive values to appear associated with certain combinations of P A values. This intuition is captured by considering the probability P (I) of a relation instance I in I P A to be equal to T bl.
Then, given b ∈ Π P A (T bl), the probability that a tuple (b, p), with p being a value for SA, is a tuple in the actual T bl, denoted P b (p), can be expressed as P b (p) = I:(b,p)∈I P (I).
Intuitively, the probability that (b, p) is a tuple in the original private table is given by the sum of the probabilities that a certain possible instance I of I P A , containing that tuple, is actually the private table.
As v = M (T bl) is released, we denote by I v the subset of possible instances in I P A that yield v. The a posteriori probability of (b, p) appearing in an instance of
Based on the above probability model, we introduce the concept of probabilistic indistinguishability.
Definition 1 (Probabilistic Indistinguishability)
Given a released data view v and two tuples b i and b j in Π P A (T bl), we say b i and b j are indistinguishable with respect to v if P bi (p) = P bj (p) and
Intuitively, the definition says that the two individuals "identified" by b i and b j are indistinguishable if for each possible private value, they have the same a priori probability of being associated with that value, and considering the released dataset v, they also have the same a posteriori probability of being associated with that value in any relation I v . In other words, the definition requires that two said P A-tuples, b i and b j , have the same distribution for their sensitive values before and after the release of v. Hence, indistinguishability upon release of v means that knowing v does not make b i and b j different in terms of their private values, although the probability distributions of the private values may have changed due to the released data. Obviously, due to the use of equality in the definition of PIND, PIND is reflexive, symmetric and transitive. That is, PIND is an equivalence relation. Thus, all the P A-tuples that are indistinguishable from each other form a partition of the P A tuples. The cardinality of each set in the partition, which is called a PIND equivalence class, provides an indication of how much privacy protection can be achieved based on indistinguishability. Hence, we introduce the following metric.
Definition 2 (k-PIND) Given a released data set v, if each PIND equivalence class has a cardinality of at least k, we then say v provides k-PIND.
Unfortunately, it is very unlikely that a practical algorithm to evaluate k-PIND can be devised. This is due in part to the difficulty of estimating an a priori probability distribution for the association of sensitive values to P A-tuple values (or to individuals, in general), and due also to the complexity of calculating the a posteriori probability distribution (shown to be intractable later in the paper). Hence, in the following subsections we propose two alternative notions, based on "local" properties and hence more practical for automatic evaluation. We also show under which conditions verifying these properties it is also possible to ensure that PIND holds.
Symmetric Indistinguishability
Given a released dataset v and the corresponding subset of possible instances in I P A that yield v, denoted by I v , the definition of Symmetric Indistinguishability requires that for each possible instance (i.e., for each possible private table yelding the same dataset), if the two P A-tuples identifying the indistinguishable individuals swap their private values while keeping other tuples unchanged, the obtained table is still one of the instances (i.e., a possible private table).
Definition 3 (Symmetric Indistinguishability) Given a released dataset v and two tuples b i and b j in Π P A (T bl), we say the tuples are Symmetrically Indistinguishable with respect to v if for each p i , p j ∈ Dom(SA) and instance
We abbreviate Symmetric Indistinguishability as SIND. In the sequel, we say two P A-tuples t 1 [P A] and t 2 [P A] can swap their private values in an instance, or simply t 1 [P A] swaps with t 2 [P A], if the resulting instance can still yield v. Note that such a swap is required for all the instances yielding v, hence this definition is in terms of v, not the current table T bl (although we used the projection Π P A (T bl) in the definition, this projection is not T bl itself and it is assumed publicly known). In other words, for two individuals (tuples in Π P A (T bl)) to be SIND is to be able to swap their private values in all the possible private tables, including T bl, that would yeld the same released dataset. Note that it is not sufficient, nor necessary, for two tuples to have the same private value in T bl to be SIND, as shown in Example 3.
Example 3 Consider the released view v in Figure 3 obtained from the table in Figure 1 .
The two P A-tuples t 9 [P A] and t 10 [P A] are SIND, because they can swap their Diagnosis values in any instance that yields v while still yielding the same v. Similarly, the two P A-tuples t 11 The definition of SIND requires a complete symmetry between two P Atuples in terms of their private values. The sets of possible private values of the SIND tuples are the same, because in each possible instance two SIND P A-tuples can swap their private values without changing the views. Furthermore, the definition based on swapping makes SIND between two P A-tuples independent on other P A-tuples. That is, even if attackers can guess the private values of all other P A-tuples, they still cannot distinguish between these two P A-tuples because the two P A-tuples still can swap their private values without affecting the views.
Symmetric indistinguishability as defined in Definition 3 implies PIND under a zero-prior-knowledge assumption, i.e., when no a priori distribution of the association of individuals with specific sensitive values is known. More technically, by zero-prior-knowledge we mean that for each pair of distinct b i and b j in Π P A (T bl), P bi (p) and P bj (p) are equal and independent for each sensitive value p.
Referring to our running example in Figure 1 , this assumption means that each patient has the same probability to have a particular diagnosis. Also, the probability of one patient to be associated with a diagnosis is independent from the probability of another patient.
The following proposition says SIND implies PIND under the zero-priorknowledge assumption. However, PIND does not imply SIND. Intuitively, this is because even though two P A-tuples have the same probability distribution for their private values, it does not guarantee they are able to switch their private values without affecting a released data v as discussed earlier. . We have two facts. First, there exists a bijection between I and I ′ . Second, if I ∈ I maps to I ′ ∈ I ′ , we have P (I) = P (I ′ ). To justify the claims, we map any I ∈ I to I ′ ∈ I ′ by switching the private values p and p ′ associated with b i and b j in I, respectively. The only difference between I and I ′ is that I has (b i , p) and (b j , p ′ ), whereas I ′ has (b i , p ′ ) and (b j , p). Under the zero-prior-knowledge assumption, the probability of an instance is equal to the product of the probabilities of all tuples in the instance. Hence, P bi (p) = P bj (p) and P bi (p ′ ) = P bj (p ′ ) jointly imply P (I) = P (I ′ ). The mapping between I and I ′ is injective. Any two different instances I 1 ∈ I and I 2 ∈ I must have at least one P A value associated with different private values. If this P A value is neither b i nor b j , then I 1 and I 2 cannot map to the same instance in I ′ , because the mapping preserves this difference (the switching doesn't change private values of any P A values other than b i or b j ). Similarly, if I 1 and I 2 have b i or b j associated with different private values, then they will also map to different instances in I ′ . The mapping is also surjective, because the definition of SIND requires that switching the private values of b and b ′ in any instance I ′ ∈ I ′ yields a valid instance I ∈ I. We use a counter example to show that PIND doesn't imply SIND. Consider the query in Figure 3 . Under the zero-prior-knowledge assumption, each of the four tuples t 9 , t 10 , t 11 , and t 12 is equally likely to have Hypertension or ChestP ain as its private value. Hence, all the four tuples are PIND. However, t 9 and t 10 are not SIND to t 11 and t 12 . Consider an instance where t 9 has Hypertension, t 10 has ChestP ain, t 11 has ChestP ain and t 12 has Hypertension. Switching the private values of t 9 and t 11 results in a new instance where both t 9 and t 10 have ChestP ain. This instance cannot yield the same result to the query in Figure 3 . Thus, t 9 and t 11 are not SIND whereas they are PIND.
Proposition 2 Symmetric Indistinguishability (SIND) is an equivalence binary relation.
Proof The relation is clearly reflexive and symmetric. We prove transitivity as follows. Intuitively we show that if (1 Since SIND is an equivalence relation, similarly to PIND, it will induce a partition on the set of individuals identifying SIND equivalence classes. A metric k-SIND is defined in a similar fashion as k-PIND.
Definition 4 (k-SIND) Given a released dataset v, if each SIND equivalence class has a cardinality of at least k, we then say v provides k-SIND.
By Proposition 1, easily follows that, under the zero-prior-knowledge assumption, if an individual is part of a k-SIND equivalence class is also part of a k-PIND one, and more generally, that if a released dataset provides k-SIND, it also provides k-PIND. The opposite does not hold. 
Relationship with k-Anonymity
In this subsection, we discuss the relationship between k-SIND and k-anonymity. In the k-anonymity literature (e.g., [27, 28, 24, 5, 20] ), the released data is an anonymized table. Anonymization is a function from quasi-IDs to recoded quasiIDs, and the anonymization process (the function M in Section 2.1) is to replace quasi-IDs with recoded quasi-IDs. We assume that the anonymization algorithm and the input quasi-IDs are known. In fact, we make a stronger assumption, called "mapping assumption", which says that (1) each quasi-ID maps to one recoded quasi-ID and (2) given a recoded quasi-ID, attackers know which set of quasi-IDs map to it. Note that the above mapping assumption always holds when quasi-ID attribute values are uniformly generalized using the same degree of generalization (e.g., 2 digits of the zip code are obfuscated in all records), and this is a quite common practice. Under the above assumption, considering all attributes P A as quasi-IDs, we have the following result about the relationship between k-SIND and k-anonymity. Figure 4 : A private table, and an anonymized version that is 2-SIND but only has 1-anonymity.
Zip Race Diagnosis
Proposition 3 Under the mapping assumption, given a released dataset in the form of a table v such that P A attributes are quasi-ID, if v provides kanonymity, with k ≥ 2, then v provides k-SIND, while the opposite does not hold.
Intuitively, if v provides k-anonymity, then at least k P A-tuple values map to each recoded quasi-ID in v. In any instance yielding v, suppose two P A-tuples b 1 and b 2 map to the same recoded quasi-ID. Then, swapping the private values of b 1 and b 2 in the original table gives an instance yielding the same v. Therefore, v provides k-SIND. Example 6 shows that a view may be k-SIND but not k-anonymous.
Example 6
The released view in Figure 5 is 2-SIND since the first two tuples form a 2-SIND set, and similarly do the second two tuples. However, the view is not 2-anonymous because the value 2202 * for the P A attribute appears only once in the released view. By definition, k-anonymity is applicable only to a single anonymized table, but not to other kinds of released data such as multiple relational views, while this paper shows that the notion of indistinguishability applies to sets of views too.
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Restricted Symmetric Indistinguishability
Since SIND requires symmetry in terms of all possible private values, it is a rather strict metric. We define another metric based on the symmetry in terms of not all possible private values but only a subset that includes the actual private values in the current private table. If P A-tuples are symmetric in terms of this subset of private values, even though they are not symmetric in terms of other values, we may still take them as indistinguishable. The intuition here is that we intend to provide more protection on a specific set of private values.
Suppose each P A-tuple is associated with a set of private values including its current private value. These sets form a collection. More specifically, we call a collection P of Dom(SA) value sets P 1 , ..., P n a private value collection, where n = |Π P A (T bl)| and Π P A (T bl) = b 1 , ..., b n , if for each s, where s = 1, ..., n, Π P σ P A=bs (T bl) ∈ P s .
If two P A-tuples are symmetric with respect to a private value collection, then we consider them indistinguishable according to Restricted Symmetric Indistinguishability which is abbreviated as RSIND.
Definition 5 (RSIND) Given a released dataset v on the private table T bl and a sensitive value collection P 1 , ..., P n , we say two P A-tuples b i and b j are RSIND with respect to that collection if the following conditions are satisfied: (1) P i = P j and (2) for each p i in P i and each
In this definition, unlike SIND, which requires swapping all possible sensitive attribute values, RSIND only requires swapping private values in a subset including the actual private values. RSIND becomes SIND if P i = Dom(SA) for each i. Figure 6 which are obtained by the private table T bl in Figure 1 . From the views, we can deduce that in T bl, t 1 [P A] cannot be associated with Obesity but can be associated with Cold and AIDS, while t 2 [P A] can be associated with all the three diagnosis. Clearly, t 1 [P A] and t 2 [P A] are not SIND. However, there exists a private value collection P 1 , ..., P 4 with P 1 = P 2 = {Cold, AIDS} and P 3 = P 4 = {Cold, AIDS, Obesity}, such that t 1 [P A] and t 2 [P A] are RSIND with respect to that collection. Indeed, P 1 and P 2 are identical, and they both include the current private values of t 1 Given a private value collection P 1 , ..., P n , RSIND is also a binary equivalence relation, hence induces a partition over the P A-tuples; and each set in the partition is called an RSIND equivalence class with respect to the collection.
Example 7 Consider the two views in
Definition 6 (k-RSIND) Given a released data v, if there exists a private value collection P such that each RSIND equivalence class in the induced partition has a cardinality of at least k, we then say v provides k-RSIND.
The following result formally states that the k-SIND property is stronger than the k-RSIND one.
Proposition 4 A released dataset v that provides k-SIND also provides k-RSIND.
Proof If v provides k-SIND, we can set P 1 , ..., P n to be the collection of all possible private values, i.e., P s = {p|∃I ∈ I v (b s , p) ∈ I}, where s = 1, ..., n. Then, any two tuples that are SIND are RSIND with respect to P 1 , . . . , P n ; hence the SIND partition is the RSIND partition with respect to P 1 , ..., P n . Clearly, the cardinality of each equivalence class in this RSIND partition is at least k since each equivalence class in the SIND partition is so.
By Proposition 3 and 4 we also derive that, under the mapping assumption, A released table v that provides k-anonymity also provides k-RSIND.
From the definition of RSIND, we can derive some interesting properties. Given a set of tuples T in the private table T bl, each private value collection, with respect to which the P A-tuples in Π P A (T ) are RSIND from each other, must include all of its actual private values; the tuples in Π P A (T ) are RSIND from each other with respect to that set of private values if there exists a collection such that they are RSIND from each other. More formally, we have Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 Given a private value collection P = P 1 , ..., P n , released dataset v, and a set T of tuples in the private table, if the tuples in Π P A (T ) are RSIND from each other with respect to P, then we have the following two facts. First, for each
we replace P i with Π P (T ) to get a new private value collection P ′ , then all the P A-tuples in Π P A (T ) are still RSIND with respect to P ′ .
Proof To prove the first claim, let Π P A (T ) be RSIND from each other w.r.t. P. By the definition of private value collection, P i ∈ P must include the private value of b i . The definition of RSIND further requires that for any value b j ∈ Π P A (T ), P j = P i . Therefore, P i must include all the private values of the tuples in T . To prove the second claim, let I ⊆ I v be the set of instances that have their private values in P, and let I ′ ⊆ I v be the set of instances that have their private values in P ′ . By the first claim, since each set P ′ i in P ′ is a subset of P i in P, we have I ′ ⊆ I. Since the tuples in Π P A (T ) are RSIND from each other, by the definition of RSIND, each two P A-tuples in Π P A (T ) can swap their private values in each instance in I. Then, since we have I ′ ⊆ I, each two P A-tuples in Π P A (T ) must be able to swap their private value in each instance in I ′ . Therefore, by the definition of RSIND, the tuples in Π P A (T ) are still RSIND w.r.t. P ′ .
Example 8 illustrate the property of RSIND stated in Proposition 5.
Example 8 Consider Figure 6 . 
there exists at least one instance in I v that contains that permutation.
The size of each set in a private value collection matters in measuring privacy disclosure, which is not reflected in k-RSIND. Generally, the more private values in the collection, the better indistinguishability we achieve, since we ignore the fewer private values that may make P A-tuples distinguishable. Also, more private values may mean better uncertainty, but as explained in Section 5, this is an orthogonal issue.
Checking Database Views
In this section, we focus on checking released data that are in the form of a view set for indistinguishability. A view set is a pair (V, v), where V is a list of selection-projection queries (q 1 , q 2 , ..., q n ) on T bl, and v is a list of relations (r 1 , r 2 , ..., r n ) that are the results, with duplicates preserved, of the corresponding queries. We may abbreviate (V, v) to v if V is understood. In this paper, "view", "query" and "query result" are used interchangeably when no confusion arises. Note all query results preserve duplicates, hence, are multisets and all relational operations in this paper are on multisets.
k-PIND verification
As anticipated in Section 2.2, checking if a view set is k-PIND is intractable. This is implied by the intractability of verifying whether a private value can be associated with a particular P A-tuple by just looking at the view set.
Lemma 1 Given a view dataset v containing only selection and projection, and a private value p in Dom(SA), it is NP-hard to decide whether there exists an instance
Proof Sketch. The Boolean auditing problem, has been shown as coNP-hard [18] . We show a reduction to our problem from its complement (Complement Boolean Auditing Diagnosis) defined as follows: Given n 0-1 variables {x 1 , ..., x n }, a family of subsets S = {S 1 , ..., S m } of {1, ..., n}, m integers b 1 , ..., b m , and any i ≤ n, among all 0-1 solutions to the system of equations i∈Sj x i = b j , j = 1, ..., m, can every x i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) be both 0 and 1? Consider a query that selects n tuples (the selection condition is on the public attributes) and projects them on the private attribute of Boolean type. Knowing the sum of n 0-1 variables is equivalent to knowing the result to this query, because the sum of 0-1 variables is equal to the number of 1s in the query result. Hence, we can reduce the Complement Boolean Auditing problem to our problem by having the same database schema, a private attribute of the Boolean type, queries having the same selection condition on the public attributes and projection on the private attribute. It then follows that each instance yielding the view set v in the Complement Boolean Auditing Problem immediately yields the view set v ′ in our problem and viceversa. Therefore, our problem is NP-hard.
We can now have a complexity result on the problem of checking k-PIND.
Theorem 1 Given a view set v, checking whether v provides k-PIND is coNPhard.
Proof Sketch. We reduce the complement of the problem considered in Lemma 1 (that is, determining if a tuple (b, p) appears in at least one instance in I v ) to the problem of checking k-PIND. Given any table T bl and view set v, we construct another table T bl ′ and view set v ′ , such that v ′ violates 2-PIND iff (b, p) appears in at least one instance in I v . Because it is NP-hard to determine the latter by Lemma 1, it is coNP-hard to determine if v ′ satisfies 2-PIND.
We construct T bl ′ and v ′ as follows. For each tuple t ∈ T bl, (1) insert both t and a new tuple t ′ into T bl ′ , such that t ′ has distinct public value b ′ and private value p ′ from all other tuples including the newly inserted ones (the domain of P A and P can be expanded if necessary); (2) 
The view set v ′ has following properties. The queries inserted by step (2) and step (3) ensure that any private values a tuple t ∈ T bl can have will also be possible for t ∈ T bl ′ to have, including the private value p ′ of t ′ . Moreover, the query inserted by step (3) Because it is NP-hard to decide the latter by Lemma 1, it is coNP-hard to determine k-PIND even for k = 2.
Considering that it is difficult to get the a priori probability distribution and to calculate the a posteriori probability, we will not further study how to check for k-PIND but will concentrate on the other two metrics.
k-SIND verification methods
In general, checking for k-SIND turns out to be also intractable, even if there are interesting tractable subcases. We first provide the intractability result and then present in Section 3.2.2 the basic mechanism adopted for two subcases, discussed in Section 3.2.3 and 3.2.4, respectively. In Section 3.2.4, we also present two sufficent conditions for k-SIND.
Complexity
Checking for k-SIND is intractable. Indeed, this also follows from the fact that it is intractable to know whether a private value can be associated with a particular P A-tuple by just looking at the view set.
Theorem 2 Given a view set v, checking whether v provides k-SIND is coNPhard.
Proof Sketch. This theorem is proved by a reduction similar to that in Theorem 1. Referring to the construction of T bl ′ in the proof of Theorem 1, each tuple t can only be SIND to the new tuple t ′ . Add a new Boolean query to select the public value b ′ of t ′ and the private value p of t, which returns false. Then, b and b
′ cannot be SIND, iff b can be associated with p, because switching the private values of t and t ′ will result in an invalid instance w.r.t. the view set. Therefore, determining k-SIND is coNP-hard.
A fundamental property used for k-SIND verification
Proposition 6 introduces an important property of SIND that will be used in the proposed verification methods.
Proposition 6
v . Since q only contains selection and projection,
A similar reasoning can be applied to prove the other direction.
We call the equation in Proposition 6 swap equation. This proposition suggests that SIND for selection-projection views has the property of being "local". Indeed, given two P A-tuples, in order to check SIND we do not need to see other P A-tuples.
More specifically, this proposition says that given v and two SIND P Atuples b 1 and b 2 , for each query q in v, if the tuples (b 1 , p 1 ) and (b 2 , p 2 ) are in an instance that yields v, and we swap their private values to get the two new tuples, i.e., (b 1 , p 2 ) and (b 2 , p 1 ), then we know that q yields the same result on {(b 1 , p 2 ), (b 2 , p 1 )} as on {(b 1 , p 2 ), (b 2 , p 1 )}. This is a necessary and sufficient condition.
As a simple example, given two P A-tuples b 1 and b 2 , if in all the instances in I v , we know they associate either with p 1 and p 2 , respectively, or p 2 and p 3 , respectively. Then b 1 and b 2 are SIND if and only if
To satisfy the swap equation
there are only two possibilities: one is
and the other is q ((b 1 , p 1 
If a view has a projection on SA and p 1 is distinct from p 2 , we can easily prove that we only need to check the latter condition. Moreover, if the projection of q contains SA, and b 1 and b 2 have more than one possible private values (i.e., there is an instance in I v ) such that b 1 and b 2 have two different values), then it is a necessary and sufficient condition for b 1 and b 2 being SIND that q((b 1 , p)) = q((b 2 , p)) holds for each possible value p.
Example 10 Consider the view q in Figure 3 with the projection on SA. Clearly, q((t 9 [P A], H)) = q((t 10 [P A], H)) and q((t 9 [P A], C)) = q((t 10 [P A], C)), where H = Hypertension and C = ChestP ain. Since H and C are the only possible values by looking at the view, we know t 9 [P A] and t 10 [P A] are SIND.
The specific k-SIND verification methods that will be presented in the paper rely on the result of Proposition 6.
k-SIND verification of views based on selection on P A attributes only
The case in which each query in the view set has a selection condition only on the attributes in P A is quite common, especially in statistical databases, and hence it is extensively studied with uncertainty measures [1, 18, 17] . In this case, checking for k-SIND can be done in polynomial time in the size of the private table and the number of views. We assume the projection of each view contains the sensitive attribute SA; otherwise, no sensitive information is involved, since we are considering the case in which the selection condition does not contain SA. From Proposition 6, we can derive the following result. To prove the only if part, we show that if the condition is not satisfied, then b 1 and b 2 are not SIND. The negation of the conditions is that there exists a view q such that one of b 1 and b 2 makes the selection condition false and the other makes it true, or they both make the condition true but they have different values in the projection on the attributes in P A of q. Clearly, in both cases q((b 1 , p)) = q ((b 2 , p) ) cannot hold. Because q contains projection on SA, by the conclusion from Proposition 6, b 1 and b 2 cannot be SIND if q ((b 1 , p) It is quite common in anonymization techniques to avoid to have the same private value for the tuples in the same equivalence class (with respect to indistinguishability); this is to avoid so called homogeneity attacks due to the lack of uncertainty [22] . Then, if the private value of two SIND tuples is different, the main condition of Proposition 7 becomes both necessary and sufficient, since the only-if part holds. When this is not the case it is only a sufficient condition, but it can still be used for conservative checking.
Based on Proposition 7, we present an efficient k-SIND checking method through partitioning. The basic idea is that for each view, we partition tuples such that each set of the partition is SIND with respect to this view, and we then intersect these partitions. Example 11 illustrates this procedure.
Example 11 Consider the two views
Π Race,Diagnosis σ Zip= ′ 22030 ′ (T bl) and Π Gender,Diagnosis σ Race= ′ W hite ′ (T bl). We partition the P A-tuples as in Figure 7 (a) by the first view and as in Figure 7(b) by the second view; the final result in Figure 7(c) is the intersection of the two partitions shown in (a) and (b). For each view, the selected tuples that have the same values on the projection are grouped in the same set of the partition, (Zip, Race) for the first and (Race, Gender) for the second; the tuples that are not selected are grouped into another set in the partition. If two P A-tuples are in the same block of the final partition, they are SIND. In this case, we only have 1-SIND.
An optimized partition and intersection procedure is shown in Figure 8 , which keeps partitioning P A-tuples using a view at a time.
Procedure Checking a view set for k-SIND with the selection only on P A attributes Input: v, T bl, and integer k Output: Proof Regarding complexity, the procedure searches for each view q the set of P A-tuples yielding the same result for q. Such searching can be done using a hash data structure, hence is constant time. For each partition, it is necessary to scan all the P A-tuples in T bl once. Thus the computing time is O(nS), where S is the size of T bl and n is the number of views in the view set.
k-SIND verification of single view released datasets
When the view set v only contains a single view with projection and any kind of selection condition, checking for k-SIND can be done in polynomial time in the size of the private table. That is, the data complexity of checking a single view for k-SIND is polynomial time.
To check k-SIND, we need first to be able to check whether two given P Atuples b 1 and b 2 are SIND. Based on Proposition 6, then, we need to check whether, for each (b 1 , p 1 ) and
Clearly, checking whether this equation holds is trivial; the difficulty is to find the set R b1b2 of all such pairs of p 1 and p 2 , which is generally intractable by Lemma 1. However, if the view set contains a single view, R b1b2 can be computed in polynomial time.
Now we first show how to find R b1b2 . The basic idea is to use bipartite graph matching to describe the constraints by v on the possible instances. Indeed, each tuple in T bl can yield at most one tuple in v and each tuple in v must be yielded by one tuple in T bl; if the tuples in T bl and in v map to the two sets of nodes in a bipartite graph, respectively, then each instance yielding v can map to a one-to-one matching in the bipartite graph (i.e., a "matching" is a mapping from one set of nodes to the other set of nodes in a bipartite graph), hence, each pair (b 1 , p 1 ) and (b 2 , p 2 ) in a possible instance must exist in a matching. Example 12 illustrates this procedure.
Example 12 Consider the T bl in Figure 9 . Its schema is Zip, Charge, Salary , where Salary is the sensitive attribute. In T bl there are three tuples. We then consider a released single view obtained by Π Salary σ Charge>=Salary (T bl) providing the result {95K, 75K}.
Zip
Charge Salary t1 22030 100K 95K t2 22030 90K 75K t3 22030 70K 85K Figure 9 : The private table in which Salary is the private attribute
We construct a bipartite graph G as follows. There are four sets of nodes U , W , X and Y in the bipartite graph as in Figure 10 . One collection of nodes in G consists of U and X; the other consists of W and Y .
Each P A-tuple b in T bl maps to a node in U , denoted by N (b). There are three P A-tuples in T bl, t 1 [P A], t 2 [P A] and t 3 [P A], mapping to the nodes in U , u 1 , u 2 and u 3 , as shown in the figure. These nodes are marked by the corresponding P A-tuples. In the figure, Zip values are omitted since the Zip values are the same.
Each tuple in v maps to a node in Y . The two tuples in v, (Salary : 95K) and (Salary : 75K), map to the nodes y 1 and y 2 , respectively. Whether there is an edge between a node in U and in Y is determined by whether it is possible that the corresponding P A-tuple in T bl has a private value to yield the corresponding tuple in v. More specifically, because (Charge : 100k) can have a Salary value 95K yielding the tuple (Salary : 95K) in v, there is an edge (u 1 , y 1 ) connecting u 1 and y 1 . On the contrary, (Charge : 90K) cannot have any Salary value such that it yields (Salary : 95K) in v; thus, no edge exists between u 2 and y 1 . For the same reason, there are edges (u 1 , y 2 ) and (u 2 , y 2 ), and there are no edges connecting u 3 and the nodes in Y . In addition, each edge is marked by the set of possible values that make the P A-tuple yield the tuple in v.
Each node u i in U has one and only one node in W as adjacent to u i . This represents the case where a tuple in a possible instance does not satisfy the selection condition C of v, hence does not yield any tuple in v. The P A-tuple (Charge : 100k) can have a Salary value greater than 100K so that the resulting tuple does not satisfy C, hence does not yield any tuple in v. So there is the node w 1 in W adjacent to u 1 , and the edge is marked by the set of Salary values that make the resulting tuple not satisfy the selection condition C of v. Similarly, w 2 and w 3 are only adjacent to u 2 and u 3 , respectively, and both edges are marked by the corresponding set of Salary values.
Finally, since a node in U may not match with the corresponding node in W in a matching, we construct a set X of dummy nodes to collect the un-matching nodes in W . The cardinality of X is |W | + |Y | − |U | and each node in X is adjacent to each node in V . Here there are two dummy nodes, x 1 and x 2 , adjacent to each of three nodes in W .
Since each tuple in T bl either yields a tuple in the view or makes C false, and each tuple in the view must be yielded by one and only one tuple in T bl, each possible instance in I v maps to a matching in the bipartite graph G. Actually, each matching corresponds to a set of possible instances because each edge is marked by a set of Salary values. For the matching in the figure, t 1 [P A] and t 2 [P A] both have only one Salary value, respectively. But t 3 [P A] can choose any Salary value greater than 70K. The current table is one of the instances mapping to this matching. Therefore, given two P A-tuples b 1 and b 2 , and two edges e 1 and e 2 incident to N (b 1 ) and N (b 2 ), if there exists a matching having e 1 and e 2 . Then SA(e 1 )× SA(e 2 ) are a subset of the possible private value pairs, where SA(e) denotes the set of Salary values associated with the edge e. For instance, from the matching in the figure, SA(u 2 , w 2 )× SA(u 3 , w 3 ), which is {75K} × {> 70K}, is the subset of R t2[P A]t3[P A] for t 2 [P A] and t 3 [P A]. The set of private value pairs is the union of all such subsets.
Checking whether two edges are in a matching can be done by removing these edges and their incident nodes to see whether there exists a matching in the induced graph. After we get all the sets of private value pairs, we can check whether two P A-tuples are SIND. The procedure illustrated in Example 12 is reported in Figure 11 .
Procedure Checking if two tuples are SIND wrt a single view v Input: v, b1 and b2 Output: True (b1 and b2 are SIND) or False Construct a bipartite graph G by v.
For each pair of edges e1 and e2 incident to N (b1) and N (b2), respectively If there exists a matching containing e1 and e2 For each p1 ∈ P (e1) and each p2 ∈ P (e2) If q({(b1, p1), (b2, p2)}) = q({(b1, p2), (b2, p1)}) Return False. Return True; One step in the procedure of Figure 11 needs to check whether for each p 1 ∈ P (e 1 ) and each p 2 ∈ P (e 2 ), we have q ({(b 1 , p 1 
This step can be done in constant time as shown by Example 13. 3 [P A] , p)} = {> 70K} and that C is the selection condition. The former one is easy. The latter one is equivalent to that C(t 3 [P A], p) ∧ ¬C(t 2 [P A], p) is true for all Salary values p in the domain. Both expressions can be checked in constant time since the size of C is considered constant for the purpose of this work.
To check a single view v for k-SIND, we can use the above procedure to check whether each pair of P A-tuples are SIND, and then partition P A-tuples to check whether v provides k-SIND by a procedure similar as in Figure 8 . Now we analyze the computational complexity of this method.
Theorem 4
The procedure in Figure 11 checks a single view for k-SIND in O(S 13/2 ) time, where S is the number of tuples in T bl.
Proof Given two P A-tuples b 1 and b 2 , in the worst case, checking SIND between them is to check in the bipartite graph associated to v whether each pair of edges adjacent to the corresponding nodes N (b 1 ) and N (b 2 ) are contained in a matching. The number of edges incident to a node is bounded by the number of the nodes in the graph, which is bounded by 2S where S is the size of T bl. Thus, there are O(S 2 ) pairs. And it is known that finding a matching for each pair is O(M 5/2 ) time [14] , where M is the number of the nodes in the graph that is bounded by 2S. So the computational time of the procedure in Figure 8 is O(S 9/2 ). Further, in the worst case, checking for k-SIND needs to check all pairs of P A-tuples, the number of which is O(S 2 ). Therefore, the total checking time is O(S 13/2 ).
Conservative k-SIND verification for the general case
In the case we are releasing multiple views and some of these views are obtained by selection on the sensitive attribute, the procedures illustrated above do not apply, and we know that the general problem of checking a view set for k-SIND is intractable. However, it is still possible to perform a conservative-style checking, i.e., applying a procedure that will always catch k-SIND violation if it occurs, but may not recognize when k-SIND holds in some cases. Since we know that checking each single view requires polynomial time, we can do a conservative checking based on Proposition 8. 
vi , by the definition of SIND, the instance
By the definition of SIND, b 1 and b 2 are SIND w.r.t. v.
We can get a SIND partition over the P A-tuples with respect to each single view in v, and then intersect these partitions to get the final partition. All the P A-tuples in the same set of the final partition must be SIND by the above proposition. Then if the cardinality of each set of the final partition is at least k, the view set provides k-SIND. This intersection of the partitions for each single view is exactly the same as the example in Figure 7 . Thus, we can use the same procedure as in Figure 8 except that checking each view for SIND between P A-tuples applies the procedure in Figure 11 .
Example 14
Consider Example 1 presented in the introduction of this paper. We can prove that the released view set reported in Figure 2 Clearly, checking in this way can be done in polynomial time. And since the condition of SIND with respect to each view in v is a necessary but not sufficient condition of SIND with respect to v, this is a conservative checking method. Example 15 illustrates a counter-example for being a necessary condition. In some cases, checking each single view is still costly, especially when the private table is large. In these cases, we can use a conservative checking method for each single view q. The basic idea is that if two P A-tuples have the same characteristics in the selection condition and have the same value on the P A attributes in the projection of q, then they are SIND. In particular, we have the following result. p 1 ) ). Because the same set of SA values satisfy C(b 1 , p) and C(b 2 , p), the two conditions must either both evaluate to true or both evaluate to false. If they evaluate to false,
This proposition says that if two P A-tuples b 1 and b 2 have the same values on the P A attributes in the projection of q, and after substituting P A with b 1 and b 2 , respectively, in the selection condition, the two substituted conditions have the same set of SA values making the conditions true, then they are SIND. We can see that this method does not look for the possible private values. Thus, a similar procedure as the checking method for the case where v selects only P A attributes can be applied. That is, generate a partition for each view by the corresponding attribute values of P A tuples and intersect these partitions.
Example 16
Consider the view Π Zip σ Charge>Salary (T bl) on the table T bl in Figure 9 . Each distinct Charge value c has the different set of Salary values making the selection condition true when you substitute Charge with c in the condition. Thus, if two P A-tuples have the same (Zip, Charge) value, then we take them as SIND; otherwise, we do not.
We believe this conservative checking is practical, since we do not check what possible private values each individual has. In fact, it has the similar idea as k-anonymization methods [27, 24, 5, 20] . Indeed, this checking looks only at the public values, and similarly k-anonymization recodes only the public values of tuples to achieve k-anonymity.
k-RSIND verification methods
In this section, we consider the problem of verifying if a released set of views provides restricted SIND as defined in Section 2.5. Technically, we have to check whether there exists an RSIND partition such that the cardinality of each set in the partition is at least k. By Proposition 5, this is equivalent to looking for the P A-tuples in each set that are RSIND with each other with respect to their current private values.
To do this, given a set T of tuples in T bl, we need to check whether for each pair of P A-tuples b 1 and b 2 in Π P A (T ), each pair of SA values p 1 and p 2 in Π SA (T ), and each instance I in I v that contains (b 1 , p 1 ) and (b 2 , p 2 ), there exists an instance p 1 )}. By a reasoning similar to the one in Proposition 6, this swap is equivalent to have for each query q in v, q ({(b 1 , p 1 
For each pair of P A-tuples in Π P A (T ) and each pair of private values in Π SA (T ), this swap equation needs to be checked. Then, for n tuples, it needs to be checked O(n 4 ) times (there are O(n 2 ) pairs of P A-tuples and O(n 2 ) pairs of private values), where n is the cardinality of T . Obviously, this is costly.
However, in most cases, if each two P A-tuples in Π P A (T ) can swap their current values, then the two P A-tuples can swap every pair of two private values in Π SA (T ). For instance, given 
Intuitively, if b 1 and b 2 are CSIND, we can swap their private values in the current table without affecting the view set.
Clearly, if each pair of tuples in Π P A (T ) is CSIND, then each pair of P Atuples in Π P A (T ) satisfies the swap equation for all the private values in Π SA (T ), hence, the tuples in Π P A (T ) are RSIND from each other. Indeed, if each q contains the projection on SA, this is a necessary and sufficient condition; otherwise, it is a sufficient condition. , p 2 ) ).
Second, if a view q does not contain a projection on SA, then by the definition of CSIND, we have q ((b 1 , p 1 )) = q((b 1 , p 2 ) ) and q((b 2 , p 1 )) = q((b 2 , p 2 )) for any two tuples (b 1 , p 1 ) and (b 2 , p 2 ) in T . Thus, for each value
Consequently, or each pair of P A-tuples b 1 and b 2 in Π P A (T ) and each pair of SA values p i and p j , we have
This concludes the if part for the proof of this case. However, the only if part does not hold in this case, because
Therefore, we apply the following checking method. If we can find a maximal partition over the P A-tuples Π P A (T bl) such that each pair of P A-tuples in each set in the partition are CSIND, then this partition is an RSIND partition. Here, "maximal" means that the union of any two sets in the partition cannot result in a set in which each pair of P A-tuples are still CSIND. In this way, we can find an RSIND partition by checking whether each pair of tuples in the current table is able to swap their private values. This provides a conservative checking algorithm for k-RSIND as follows.
We construct a graph G with one node for each tuple. If two tuples are CSIND, which can be easily checked based on the current private table, an edge is drawn between the corresponding nodes. Then, a complete subgraph of G is a subset of an RSIND set. Therefore, the problem of finding an RSIND partition becomes the problem of finding a maximal clique partition. If each query of v contains the projection on SA, the above checking algorithm is a precise (not conservative) algorithm.
Considering the special case where each query of v contains the projection on SA, we obtain a negative result about the complexity of the general problem of checking k-RSIND.
Theorem 5 Given a released view set v, it is NP-hard to decide whether v provides k-RSIND.
Proof We showed that finding an RSIND partition is equivalent to find a maximal clique partition. Since we know that the problem of finding a clique partition with each block's size of at least k is NP-hard [15] , we can conclude that deciding whether a view set v provides k-RSIND is also NP-hard.
Nevertheless, we can use the heuristic algorithms in [15] to find a clique partition with each block of size at least k. This will result in a conservative algorithm even for the special case where each query in v contains the projection on SA.
For example, consider the views in Figure 6 . We construct a graph as in Figure 12 . Each edge represents that the P A-tuples corresponding to the two adjacent nodes are CSIND. An RSIND partition maps to a maximal clique partition in the graph. 
Indistinguishability verification in the presence of updates
In this section we illustrate preliminary results on the problem of verifying indistinguishability in the case updates are performed on the private table between the times when two queries are issued.
Example 17 Consider the table in Figure 1 and the view Π Diagnosis σ Zip= ′ 22030 ′ (T bl) which is considered to provide sufficient indistinguishability and hence has already been released. After the release of this view, a new tuple t with Zip value 22030 and Diagnosis value ChestP ain is inserted. After this insertion, the same view on the modified table is asked to be released again. Each of the two releases are safe independently, but it is not safe if attackers combine the two releases with the modification. More specifically, attackers can deduce the private value of the new tuple t from the difference of the result of the second query and that of the first query if they know t is the new tuple. Recall that we assume Π P A (T bl) is public information and hence attackers know the insertion of Π P A (t).
We use (q τ , r τ ) to denote a query q τ on the table T bl at the time τ , denoted T bl τ , and the corresponding result r τ = q τ (T bl τ ). We want to determine whether a view set (q 0 , r 0 ), ..., (q c , r c ) provides k-SIND (k-RSIND) for T bl at each time τ , where τ = 0, 1, ..., c. More specifically, let v ′ τ be the released data that includes the released views (q 0 , r 0 ), ..., (q c , r c ) and information about the modifications (insertion, deletion and updates) at each time (without of course explicit knowledge about the private values of the inserted, deleted and updated tuples). Then, we require v If attackers do not know anything about modifications and assume any sequence of modifications is equally possible between two queries, then the com-bination of two queries is useless for the inference of private values. This is because the status of the two tables are completely uncorrelated, and this situation is equivalent to the one in which two queries are executed on two different table instances.
Thus, we assume for two consecutive views (q τ , r τ ) and (q τ +1 , r τ +1 ), it is public information that Π P A (T bl τ +1 ) is partitioned into 3 sets P A o , P A u and P A i , where the private values for P A o -tuples do not change between T bl τ and T bl τ +1 , the private values for P A u -tuples may be updated, and P A i -tuples are the newly inserted ones in T bl τ +1 . The common P A-tuples between T bl τ and T bl τ +1 are P A o ∪ P A u . And we denote P A d the set of P A-tuples that are deleted from T bl τ , i.e., P A d = Π P A (T bl τ ) − Π P A (T bl τ +1 ), which is also known because Π P A (T bl τ ) and Π P A (T bl τ +1 ) are known.
Under the above assumptions, we present the general checking method for k-SIND and k-RSIND in the case of updates to the private table. We will transform this case into the case of static tables, and then apply the checking methods in the previous section for the case of static tables. Given a view set v and the table instances T bl 0 ...T bl c , we construct a table instance T bl s and a view set v s as follows.
• T bl s has the same the schema as the private table except that there are two additional public attributes Start and End.
• At time 0, copy all the tuples in T bl 0 into T bl s . Mark the Start value of each tuple by 0 and the End value by ∞.
• At time τ + 1, where 0 ≤ τ ≤ c − 1, copy all the inserted and the updated tuples from τ to τ + 1 into T bl s , and keep the deleted and the old tuples that are updated in T bl s . For each inserted tuple whose P A-tuple is in P A i and each new updated tuple whose P A-tuple is in P A u , mark the Start value by τ + 1 and the End value by ∞; for each deleted tuple whose P A-tuple is in P A d and each old updated tuple whose P A-tuple is in P A o , mark the End value by τ .
• For each view (q τ , r τ ) in v, where q τ = Π Xτ σ Cτ and r τ = q τ (T bl τ ), transform it into a view (q
We have the following conclusion about this construction. 
Related Work
The work on k-anonymity [27, 28, 24, 5, 20] is probably the closest to the investigation proposed in this paper, since its main goal is to guarantee the indistinguishability of single individuals in groups of at least k individuals. We have devoted Section 2.4 to analyse the relationship between k-anonymity and the notion of indistinguishability we propose. Apart from minor technical differences, our proposed notion can be considered a generalization of k-anonymity, since it can be used to evaluate indistinguishability of individuals not only with respect to an anonymized table, but with respect to an arbitrary set of views obtained by projection-selection queries, possibly involving both public and sensitive attributes.
Recently, there has been other work aiming to achieve good uncertainty while gaining k-anonymity by imposing additional requirements on anonymization. In particular, Li et al. [21] proposed t-closeness for measuring privacy disclosure as an improvement over l-diversity, originally proposed by Machanavajjhala et al. [22] ; the main idea is to measure the difference between the overall distribution of sensitive attribute values in the released data and the one in specific equivalence classes (QuasiID groups). We can see some relationship between this work and ours since we also consider the values of sensitive attributes in order to evaluate the indistinguishability of individuals (as opposed to k-anonymity which only focuses on Quasi-ID attributes). In particular, the definition of probabilistic indistinguishability (PIND) considers the a-posteriori probability of associating an individual with a given sensitive value, based on the release of a set of views. However, both l-diversity and t-closeness have been defined and evaluated on single anonymized tables, while we consider also projection-selection relational views and sets of views. The problem of guaranteeing uncertainty over sensitive attribute values has also been considered when multiple views are released by Yao et al. [32] . However, that work is actually focused on uncertainty only, and can be considered as orthogonal to the one presented in this paper, which is focused on the aspect of identity protection. It may be integrated in a general approach, as briefly discussed in Section 6, but this will be subject of future work.
The idea of exploiting symmetries among sensitive values, originally proposed in the preliminary version of this paper [31] seems to have influenced another recent proposal of anonymization techniques. Indeed, Koudas et al. [19] considered the problem of anonymizing data in order to answer aggregate queries and proposed a technique based on the permutation of sensitive attribute values to achieve anonymization, as an alternative to generalization.
An other approach presenting an alternative to generalization based on the analysis of associations of sensitive attribute values with QuasiID groups identifying sets of individuals has been proposed by Xiao and Tao [30] ; they propose the publication of two different tables to separate sensitive attribute values from the specific sequences of public attribute values (QuasiID values) that may reidentify individuals. While the analysis of the above mentioned associations can be considered related to the analysis of symmetries made in this paper, that proposal does not provide tools to evaluate the indistinguishability of individuals based on the release of multiple views (except for the two provided by their anonymization technique).
Previous work exists about the issue of privacy or secrecy disclosure through the release of general database views. The conditions of perfect secrecy are studied in [25, 9 ] using a probability model, and in [33] using query conditional containment. In this paper, we addressed the case in which some partial disclosure is tolerated (actually desired), and hence the "undesired" disclosure needs to be evaluated.
Except for the study of k-anonymity and of the derived notions mentioned above, the privacy metrics used in prior work have mainly been based only on the uncertainty of private property values, i.e., the uncertainty about what private value an individual has associated with. These metrics can be classified into two categories: non-probabilistic and probabilistic. The non-probabilistic metrics are mainly used in the fields of inference problem of statistical databases [1, 18, 17, 29] , multilevel databases [23, 6] and general purpose databases [8, 6, 32] . The most often used one is the following: if the private value of an individual cannot be uniquely inferred, the release of data about the individual is considered safe [1, 23, 8, 18, 6, 17] . The other one is the cardinality of the set of possible private values for each individual, among which attackers cannot determine which one is the actual one [29, 32] (The metric used in [32] is an uncertainty metric in spite of the notion of k-anonymity introduced). Probabilistic metrics are also used. Authors use the probability value associated with the actual value [13, 17] or the variance of the probability distribution of private values [1, 26] . Most work in privacy-preserving data mining uses probability-based metrics. Their metrics are based only on the characteristics of the a posteriori probability distribution of private values [3, 2, 11] , or on both a priori and the a posteriori distribution [2, 10, 16, 4] . The work in [7] uses indistinguishability based on probability "distance" as a privacy metric.
Conclusions and Future Research Directions
In this paper, we identified a requirement of privacy in data release, namely indistinguishability, in addition to uncertainty. We first gave three definitions of indistinguishability, namely, PIND, SIND, and RSIND. Then we concentrated on checking database views against these indistinguishability metrics. We believe that in most cases PIND is impractical due to the difficulty of obtaining the a priori probability distribution and calculating the a posteriori probability distribution. Generally, checking for k-SIND is intractable. We presented two cases where polynomial algorithms are possible. Furthermore, we presented two conservative checking methods. Checking for RSIND is pretty easy, but checking for k-RSIND is intractable and can be done in a conservative way with heuristic polynomial algorithms.
Our work can be extended in several directions. In our running example we used a discrete domain for the sensitive attribute (Diagnosis). In general the sensitive attributes can be drawn also from an infinite or a continuous domain; it should not be difficult to extend our study to infinite discrete, or continuous domains.
We also assumed that each P A-tuple uniquely identifies an individual, however even if the P A attributes act as a quasi-identifier, it is entirely possible that a P A-tuple re-identifies a set of individuals and not a single one. Note that our definitions of indistinguishability hold also in this case, and we believe that the proposed verification methods apply as well.
In addition to these minor extensions, there are four major extensions that we foresee.
Firstly, our definitions require "perfect" indistinguishability, i.e., they require complete symmetry in terms of their private attribute values between individuals. But indistinguishability could have a degree. That is, the fact that two individuals are mostly symmetric in terms of sensitive attribute values, may lead to consider them as indistinguishable (ignoring at this level the diversity problem). This is an interesting future research topic, and the introduction of the notion of RSIND is towards this direction.
Secondly, we may want a crowd, i.e., a set of indistinguishable individuals, to have some additional properties in order to introduce some "diversity" among them. For example, we may require that k indistinguishable individuals have at least l distinct Zip values, which introduces a territorial diversity into the indistinguishable crowd. The extension of the privacy metric to include uncertainty may be inspired by the work on diversity on single released tables [22] or by the work in [32] that is specifically focused on multiple views. Alternatively, an approach similar to t-closeness [21] may be extended to the case of multiple views, measuring the difference between the distribution of private values within each SIND/RSIND partition and the distribution of the private values in the whole private table.
Thirdly, it would be interesting to study methods to modify views to achieve sufficient indistinguishability and uncertainty accordingly to an integrated metric obtained along the lines illustrated above.
Finally, a deeper investigation is needed for the case in which updates to the original private data are considered, following the preliminary results illustrated in Section 4.
